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During the past three years, central banks have faced challenges 
that few foresaw during the period known as the Great Moderation. 
During the crisis, central banks have responded with traditional 
interest rate tools, been forced to deal with the zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates, and expanded the scope of their lender of 
last resort function. In addition, quantitative easing and credit easing 
policies have entered the toolkit of central banks. After briefly dis- 
cussing the instruments of monetary policy and reviewing the per- 
formance of inflation targeting, I consider three suggested modifica- 
tions to this policy framework. These are raising the average target 
for inflation, incorporating additional objectives, and switching to 
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I. Introduction
During the past three years, central banks have faced challenges that 
few foresaw during the period known as the Great Moderation. The crisis 
in financial markets and the most severe global recession since the 
1930s, combined with the limitations imposed on conventional monetary 
policy tools by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, has lead 
to new thinking on the importance of financial stability, the roles of 
financial frictions, the appropriate goals of monetary policy, and the 
range of tools that can be used to achieve those goals.
* Professor, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz, 1156 High St., Santa 
Cruz, CA 95064, USA, (Tel) +1-831-459-4082, (Fax) +1-831-459-5077, (E-mail) 
walshc@ucsc.edu. This paper is based on one prepared for the 2010 Bank of 
Korea International Conference, May 31-June 1, 2010 which, in turn, draws 
from Walsh (2009b). I would like to thank Mark Carney, Jouko.Vilmunen, and 
Tony Yates for comments on earlier versions of some of this material.
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2011, Vol. 24, No. 4]
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS428
Of course, prior to the recent crisis, many countries, including Korea, 
had experienced first hand the economic disruptions posed by exchange 
rate and financial crises. The adoption of inflation targeting by the Bank 
of Korea in 1998 was an important factor contributing to Korea's re- 
covery from the crisis of the late 1990s. So perhaps the distinguishing 
characteristic of the recent crisis is its impact on developed economies 
such as the U.S. and those of the EU, rather than that it represented 
a new phenomenon.1
The decade prior to the crisis represented one in which policy makers 
and academic economists shared a broad consensus about monetary 
policy (Svensson 2002; Goodfriend 2007). Among the key aspects of this 
consensus were the role of price stability as the primary objective of mon- 
etary policy and the importance of central bank credibility and trans- 
parency. Most discussions of monetary policy emphasized the dual ob- 
jectives of stabilizing inflation around a low level and stabilizing some 
measure of real economic activity. Financial stability was also mentioned 
as desirable, but by and large discussions of monetary policy took fi- 
nancial stability for granted, and models used for policy analysis almost 
always assumed financial frictions were irrelevant for policy design.
My purpose in this paper is to consider how the crisis has influenced 
our thinking about two aspects of policy― instruments and objectives 
― that are integral to the design and implementation of monetary policy. 
In Section 2, I focus on the instruments of monetary policy. During the 
crisis, central banks have responded with traditional interest rate tools, 
been forced to deal with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, 
and expanded the scope of their lender of last resort function. In ad- 
dition, quantitative easing and credit easing policies have entered the 
toolkit of central banks. Policy implementation typically is dependent on 
the particular financial structure within each country, so, given the 
limits to my knowledge, the discussion focuses on developments in the 
U.S.
In Section 3, I turn to policy objectives and the overall policy frame- 
work. After briefly reviewing the performance of inflation targeting, I 
consider three suggested modifications to this policy framework. These 
are raising the average target for inflation, incorporating additional ob- 
jectives, and switching to price level targeting. Conclusions are summar- 
ized in the final section.
1 For a historical review of financial crises, see Reinhart and K. Rogoff (2009).
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II. Instruments
The list of central bank instruments has expanded greatly over the 
past three years. Traditionally, this list was quite short, consisting of, 
in the case of the United States, open market operations, the discount 
rate, and the required reserve ratio. As a consequence of the financial 
crisis, the Fed at one point listed 11 different policy tools (five of those 
have now expired).
The search for new tools was motivated by a desire to expand the 
Fed's role as a lender of last resort to a much wider class of institu- 
tions and on a much wider range of collateral than previously, and by 
the fact that the federal funds rate had been cut to zero. In this section, 
I first focus on the conventional tools of monetary policy, in normal 
times and at the ZLB. I discuss the role of paying interest on reserves 
in the Fed's strategy for returning its balance sheet to normal. I then 
turn to the more unconventional aspects of recent Fed policy.
A. Conventional
To analyze conventional monetary policy, it is useful to specify a con- 
ventional model. The standard, closed economy new Keynesian model 
that has dominated policy analysis consists of an expectational IS rela- 
tionship given by 
π
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and an inflation adjustment equation given by
πt＝β Et πt＋1＋κ xt＋et,                     (2)
where xt is the output gap, πt is inflation, rt
n
 is the equilibrium real 
interest rate when the output gap is zero, et is a cost shock, and it is 
the nominal interest rate. These equations can be derived by log- 
linearizing a general equilibrium model consisting of a representative 
household and firms operating in goods markets characterized by mono- 
polistic competition in the face of time-dependent price adjustment strat- 
egies.2
2 For a textbook derivation, see Walsh (2010, ch. 8). The discussion in this 
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In the context of this model, the conventional policy instrument is 
taken to be the current policy interest rate. The expectational IS curve 
given in (1) can be solved forward to obtain
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It is clear from (3) that both the current policy rate and expectations 
about its future path are important.
The idea that it is both current policy and expectations of the future 
policy path that matter has played an important role in discussions of 
monetary policy at the ZLB, a point emphasized by Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003). Even when the current policy rate is at zero, the 
central bank still has the potential to influence real spending if it can 
affect expectations of future real interest rates. If it＝0 and is expected 
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Thus, output can be stimulated by raising expected inflation, by lowering 
expected future real interest rates, or by raising the natural real rate, 
either now or in the future. If the central bank is able to commit to 
future policies, it can stimulate current output by committing to a lower 
future path for it+i. In particular, this would involve keeping the policy 
rate at zero even when the natural rate has risen to levels that would 
normally call for the policy rate to move back into positive territory. That 
is, the central bank commits to maintaining a zero-rate policy even when 
the ZLB is no longer a binding constraint (Eggertsson and Woodford 
2003). As a consequence, some models suggest that the ZLB does not 
represent a serious constraint on monetary policy, and most research 
suggests that the costs of the ZLB are quite small if the central bank 
enjoys a high level of credibility (e.g., Eggertsson and Woodford 2003; 
Adams and Billi 2006; Nakov 2008).
The finding that optimal policy involves committing to lower interest 
rate in the future is consistent with the strategies proposed for Japan 
when it faced the ZLB. For example, Krugman (1998), McCallum (2000), 
section and the following one borrows from Walsh (2009b).
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Svensson (2001, 2003), and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) all proposed 
that the Bank of Japan commit to policies that would promise future 
inflation. Raising inflation expectations and committing to keeping the 
policy interest rate low in the future are not really separate policy options. 
It is by committing to lower future policy rates that the central bank 
affects future inflation at the ZLB. It is not surprising that the Bank of 
Japan was criticized for its unwillingness to commit to higher inflation 
and its decision to raise interest rates above zero prematurely (see, for 
example, the discussion by Ito 2004 or Hutchison and Westermann 
2006, chapter 1). But commitment policies require that any promise to 
inflate in the future must be carried out; failing to do so would remove 
the possibility of influencing expectations if the ZLB were encountered 
again in the future.
Promising future inflation while at the ZLB raises a critical difficulty: 
central banks may lack the credibility to make such promises. Bernanke, 
Reinhart, and Sack (2004) conclude, based on a study of market reac- 
tions to speeches by Federal Reserve Governors, that it is possible to 
affect expectations about the future path of the policy rate. However, 
even central banks that had developed high levels of credibility prior to 
the current crisis may find it difficult to steer future expectations in a 
ZLB environment in which they lack a track record.
In fact, rather than promising future inflation, policy makers seem to 
be concerned that expectations of future inflation remain firmly anchored. 
For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke stressed that the Fed 
would prevent a rise in inflation as the economy recovers from the cur- 
rent recession, stating “... that it is important to assure the public and 
the markets that the extraordinary policy measures we have taken in 
response to the financial crisis and the recession can be withdrawn in 
a smooth and timely manner as needed, thereby avoiding the risk that 
policy stimulus could lead to a future rise in inflation.”3
If the central bank lacks the high degree of credibility implicit in the 
optimal commitment solution or is unwilling to let inflation expectations 
rise, the ZLB does pose a serious constraint on stimulating the economy. 
And when policy is conducted in a discretionary environment in which 
the central bank cannot affect expectations directly, the costs of the 
ZLB rise markedly.4
3 Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services in July 2009. 
Mishkin (2009) is also explicit in arguing that even in a financial crisis it is 
imperative to keep inflation expectations anchored.
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However, most of the research on the ZLB has relied on models based 
on linear approximations to the structural equations. Levin et al. (2009) 
show that non-linearities can become very important when simulating a 
large “Great Recession” shock as opposed to a typical “Great Moderation” 
shock. They find that even a credible central bank that can affect ex- 
pectations about the future path of policy rates may have limited ability 
to stabilize the economy when a large negative shock occurs.
B. And Unconventional
In addition to conventional tools, central banks have employed uncon- 
ventional policy instruments as well. These can be classified as either 
involving expansions of the money supply for a given policy rate (nor- 
mally at zero), extensions of the central bank's lender of last resort facil- 
ities, and policies aimed to direct credit to specific sectors of the econ- 
omy. In the terminology of Ben Bernanke, the former actions are usually 
characterized as quantitative easing, the latter as credit easing.
a) Quantitative Easing
Figure 1 shows the expansion of reserves in the United States during 
2008 and 2009. The solid line represents total reserves, and these grew 
from $45 billion in August 2008 to over $1 trillion by the last two 
months of 2009. Initially, most of this growth represented an increase 
in borrowed reserves as would be expected in a financial crisis with the 
central bank acting as a lender of last resort. What has differentiated 
these policies is their extension to non-bank institutions, reflecting the 
growth in recent decades in non-bank finance relative to bank finance 
in the United States. Borrowed reserves peaked at $698 billion in 
November 2008 and then declined to just over $200 billion at the end 
of 2009. The difference between total and borrowed reserves is non- 
borrowed reserves, and as borrowed reserves have shrunk, the Fed has 
expanded nonborrowed reserves so that total reserves have continued 
to expand. The M1 measure of the money supply, also shown in the 
figure, has risen along with total reserves.
In the basic framework of a new Keynesian model, money demand is 
usually motivated by including real money balances in the utility func- 
tion, and the first order condition for the representative household's 
choice of money holdings states that the marginal rate of substitution 
4 See Adams and Billi 2007 and Nakov 2008.
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FIGURE 1
TOTAL, BORROWED, EXCESS RESERVES (LEFT SCALE) AND 
M1 (RIGHT SCALE) IN THE U.S. (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
between real money balances and consumption is equal to the oppor- 
tunity cost of holding money, or
=
+
( , , ) ,
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where C is consumption, m equals real money balances, N is labor 
hours, i is the nominal rate of interest, and Ux denotes the marginal 
utility of x. If monetary policy is specified in terms of the nominal inter- 
est and utility is separable in m as was assumed in (1) and (2), then it, 
Ct, Nt, and prices are determined independently of m and (4) just re- 
sidually pins down the nominal quantity of money. Quantitative easing 
is not a separate policy instrument.
At least that is the standard analysis when the nominal interest rate 
is positive. At the ZLB, things may be different. When i＝0 the issue of 
whether an expansion in the money supply can affect the real economy 
depends on the nature of money demand. If 
lim m
d＝∞,
                            i→0
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we have the classic case of a liquidity trap. Increases in the nominal 
quantity of money simply increase real balances with no effect on the 
price level. In a liquidity trap, short-term riskless securities and money 
are perfect substitutes, so a substitution of money for government debt 
via an open market operation does not require the public to rebalance 
their portfolios. However, intertemporal models imply that the price level 
today depends on the expected future value of money. As long as nominal 
interest rates are expected to be positive in the future, prices in the fu- 
ture will depend on the future supply of money.5
An increase in the money supply now that is anticipated to be per- 
manent will raise both expected future prices and current prices. A quan- 
titative easing policy that leads to an expansion of the money supply at 
the ZLB will affect the economy, as long as the rise in the money sup- 




                          i→0
then the situation is different. The existence of a satiation level of real 
balances m̅ implies that further expansions of the money quantity of 
money must produce increases in the price level and so changes to the 
current money supply can still affect the economy.
If interest is paid on bank reserves, then the quantity of reserves and 
the policy interest rate can be treated as two distinct instruments. Ignoring 
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where Ux(t) is short-hand for Ux(Ct, mt, Nt). Even if Um(t＋s)＝0 for s＝0, ..., S, the 
equilibrium price level is affected by mt＋s for s＞S. See Walsh (2010, ch. 2). 
6 A second aspect of an open market operation at the ZLB is that as long as 
nominal interest rates are expected to be positive at some point in the future, 
purchases of short-term government debt by the central bank alter the consoli- 
dated government's intertemporal budget constraint. The substitution of non- 
interest bearing liabilities for interest-bearing liabilities lowers the present value 
of government revenues needs. This implies that taxes must fall, either now or 
in the future, to maintain budget balance. Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) showed 
that these fiscal effects can have a significant impact on nominal income at the 
ZLB. When prices are sticky, this rise in nominal income takes the form of an 
expansion in real output.
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 is the interest paid on money.7 When interest is paid on 
money, the Friedman distortion that arises when private agents econo- 
mize on their money holdings due to a positive opportunity cost of holding 
money can be eliminated as long as it＝it
m
; the traditional Friedman 
rule, a deflation with the nominal rate equal to zero, is no longer neces- 
sary. This means that, with two instruments, monetary policy can use 
it to ensure a low and stable inflation rate and it
m
 to ensure an efficient 
level of money holdings.
The Fed has emphasized that as the U.S. economy recovers it can 
raise the interest rate paid on reserves to prevent excessive expansion of 
credit. Payment of interest on reserves, begun in October 2008, allows the 
Fed to move to a channel system of interest rate control, a system suc- 
cessfully employed by the ECB and the central banks of Canada, New 
Zealand, and Australia. Under such a system, the central bank establi- 
shes standing facilities for lending at a penalty over the target for the 
policy rate and pays interest on reserves at a rate less than the policy 
rate target. This creates a channel, or corridor, with an upper and lower 
limit on interest rate movements.
A key aspect of a channel system is that the level of the target inter- 
est rate and the quantity of bank reserves are decoupled. The target inter- 
est rate can be increased, for example, shifting the channel upwards, 
without changing the quantity of reserves. Because the interest rate paid 
on reserves is increased in line with the target rate, the opportunity 
cost of holding reserves remains unchanged. Because the Fed now has 
the ability to pay interest on reserves, it could conceivably move to raise 
interest rates as the economy recovers without needing to reduce the 
huge expansion in reserves that has occurred over the past two years.
b) Credit Easing
Credit easing policies are associated with changes in the composition 
7 It is important to note that the interest paid on reserves must be financed 
through tax revenues and not by simply creating additional reserves. Otherwise, 
the opportunity cost of holding money is not altered.
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FIGURE 2
UNCONVENTIONAL POLICIES: LENDING TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (■ DARK 
GRAY) AND LIQUIDITY PROVISION (■ LIGHT GRAY)
of the central bank's asset holdings.8 During the past two years, the size 
of the Fed's asset holdings and their composition have changed dramat- 
ically. The initial expansion of the Fed's asset holdings occurred through 
its programs to extend credit and liquidity to financial institutions. The 
growth in these two categories is shown in Figure 2. After averaging 
$30.5 billion from January 2007 until the end of July 2007, they rose 
to a peak of $1,944.8 billion in December 2008. Since then, this cate- 
gory of asset holdings has declined significantly, so that by the end of 
March 2010, they totaled $117.6 billion. The pattern reflected in Figure 
2 is consistent with the behavior of a lender of last resort, providing 
temporary liquidity to markets during a crisis and then allowing this 
credit extension to shrink as markets return to more normal conditions.
However, while lending to financial institutions and the provision of 
liquidity have returned to something approaching pre-crisis levels, the 
size of the Fed's balance sheet has not. As lending and liquidity programs 
have shrunk, the Fed has purchased longer-term securities representing 
direct obligations of Fannie Mae, Feddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan 
8 Carlson, Haubrich, Cherny, and Wakefield (2009) provide a nice discussion of 
the asset side of the Fed's balance sheet.
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FIGURE 3
UNCONVENTIONAL POLICIES: LENDING TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
(■ BLACK), LIQUIDITY PROVISION (■ LIGHT GRAY), AND PURCHASES OF 
LONG-TERM ASSETS (■ DARK GRAY)
Banks as well as mortgage-backed securities. This expansion in long-term 
security holdings is shown in Figure 3. As of the end of June 2010, the 
Fed held $1,284.5 billion of these securities.
The effectiveness of credit easing policies that alter the composition of 
the central bank's asset holdings rests on the extent to which financial 
markets are segmented. The rationale for purchasing long-term securities, 
similar to that of “Operation Twist” in the 1960s, is to reduce the spread 
between long and short-term interest rates. If long-term and short-term 
debt are imperfect substitutes in private sector portfolios, then altering 
their relative supplies should move their relative yields. Central bank 
purchases that reduce the supply of long-term debt in private holdings 
would then raise their price and lower long-term yields.9
During the monetarists-Keynesian debates of the 1960s, both sides of 
the debate took the view that financial and real assets were imperfect 
substitutions. Both sides emphasized that shifts in portfolio composition 
generated by open market operations required adjustments in relative 
9 As with open market operations in standard short-term debt, changes in the 
composition of government debt will have fiscal implications; see Auerbach and 
Obstfeld (2005).
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returns and asset prices to restore equilibrium (Tobin 1969; Meltzer 1995; 
Goodfriend 2000; Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson 2004). Disagreement 
focused on the range of assets that were potential substitutes for money 
in private portfolios. Monetarists emphasized that portfolio rebalancing 
could affect real asset holdings, not just financial holdings (see Meltzer 
1995). Thus, the reduction in the liquidity yield of money that occurs 
when its quantity is increased causes a substitute into both financial 
and real assets. Since the private sector must, ultimately, hold the larger 
stock of money, this attempt at rebalancing portfolios raises the prices 
of both financial and real asset, creating incentives for capital goods 
producers to expand production.
As noted by Clouse et al. (2003), when short-term interest rates are 
at zero, an open market purchase of long-term government debt by the 
central bank is equivalent to a standard open market purchase of short- 
term debt for money plus a purchase of long-term debt financed by a 
sale of central bank holdings of short-term government debt, in effect, an 
operation that twists the maturity structure of privately held government 
debt.
Whether such debt management operations are effective is an empirical 
issue, and an issue that has, at least in the United States, long been 
debated. Modigliani and Sutch (1967) found little evidence that Operation 
Twist mattered in the 1960s, though this probably reflected the small 
scale of the operation relative to offsetting operations by the Treasury. 
Prior to the current crisis, many argued that it would require extremely 
large open market operation in non-standard assets to have a significant 
impact on yields (e.g., Clouse et al. 2003). Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack 
(2004) offer one of the most extensive attempts to employ event studies 
and term structure models to determine if non-standard central bank 
open market operations have affected yields. Their general conclusion is 
that shifts in relative asset supplies, or the expectations of such shifts, 
do affect yields. However, it is not clear from their analysis whether these 
shifts lead to the sustained movements in relative yields that would be 
need to successfully stabilize real economic activity. Gagnon et al. (2010) 
discuss some of the more recent evidence and conclude that announce- 
ments of the Fed's asset purchases has lowered yields, though, as they 
note, using an announcement approach (as did Bernanke, Reinhart, and 
Sack 2004) to capture the effects relies on the assumption that financial 
markets are efficient in processing information. This assumption might 
be suspect as the rationale for credit easing policies is that financial 
markets are not operating efficiently.
                IMPLEMENTING MONETARY POLICY 439
FIGURE 4
PRIVATELY HELD FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT WITH MATURITY GREATER 
THAN ONE YEAR AND FEDERAL RESERVE LONG-TERM ASSET PURCHASES, 
BOTH EXPRESSED AS A PERCENT OF GDP. ALSO SHOWN ARE THE 
SPREADS BETWEEN THE YIELDS ON 1-YEAR AND 10-YEAR FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT DEBT AND 30-YEAR MORTGAGE RATE (RIGHT AXIS).
Gagnon et al. (2010) also provide some time series evidence on the 
impact on yields of the net supply of long-term debt held by the private 
sector. Using monthly data from 1985 until June 2008, just prior to the 
start of the Fed's purchases, they find that an increase in the debt stock 
held by the public lowed prices and raised yields by a statistically signi- 
ficantly amount.10 They conclude that the size of the Fed's purchases 
reduced yields by between roughly 40 and 80 basis points, depending 
on their empirical specification. One potential problem with this estimate 
is that it assesses the size of the Fed's purchases assuming that the 
total stock of long-term government debt is fixed. However, while the 
average maturity of Federal government debt held privately has fallen 
from 57 months at the beginning of 2008 to 49 months by September 
2009, total debt (as a percent of GDP) held by the public has risen dra- 
10 Their point estimates implied that an increase in longer-term debt supply 
equal to 1 percent of GDP (around $140 billion at 2008 GDP) would raise the 
10-year term premium by between 4.4 and 6.4 basis points.
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matically. As Figure 4 show, despite the Fed's long term asset purchases, 
the stock of privately held long-term government debt has risen. The 
spread between the rates on 10-year and 1-year Treasury debt has not 
fallen, though the spread between the 1-year rate and the rate on mort- 
gages has dipped. Thus, while the Fed purchases may have reduced 
rates relative to the increase that might have been observed, it is less 
clear what the net impact on rates has been.
Spiegel (2006) summarizes some of the evidence on the impact of the 
Bank of Japan's purchases of long-term government bonds and quanti- 
tative easing policies that expanded bank reserves. Spiegel concludes 
that the two policies did lower long-term interest rates but that it is dif- 
ficult to determine which policy was most effective. The policies may also 
have lowered rates by signalling the Bank of Japan's willingness to main- 
tain its zero interest rate policy.
If purchases of long-term debt are effective in stimulating aggregate 
demand, there remains the question of why they should be carried out 
by the central bank. These operations shorten the maturity structure of 
the Treasury's outstanding debt. The Treasury can alter the composition 
of its outstanding publicly held debt; there is no reason this should be 
done by the central bank. Holding long-term debt on its balance sheet 
exposes the central bank to losses when interest rates eventually rise. 
Goodfriend (2000) discusses how this necessitates greater coordination 
between the central bank and the fiscal authority and stresses the need 
for a Treasury guarantee against such losses. Clouse et al. (2003) also 
consider this issue.
Finally, the central bank can conduct open market operations in private 
sector credit instruments as the Fed has done. Clouse et al. (2003) note 
that such actions would put the central bank in the position of evaluating 
credit risk and affecting the allocation of credit across borrowers in the 
private sector. Relative to open market operations in government debt, 
the supply of private credit instruments is not exogenous; central bank 
purchases that raised the price of such instruments and lowered their 
return would in all likelihood induce an expansion of issues by the pri- 
vate sector. In fact, the real effects of such operations would in part rest 
on the transference of risk from the private sector to the central bank. 
However, contract enforcement may be a smaller problem for central bank 
intermediated debt, thereby reducing borrowing limitations that would 
otherwise constrain private sector borrowing (see Gertler and Karadi 
2011).
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III. The Policy Framework
The policy interest rate, the rate paid on reserves, and commitments 
to the future path of policy rates are all likely to be important instru- 
ments of monetary policy. But what objectives should these tools be used 
to achieve? The consensus view leading into the financial crises was 
that best practice monetary policy could be summarized as a policy of 
flexible inflation targeting.11 The name reflected the primacy of inflation 
as the ultimate objective of monetary policy; the flexibility reflected the 
short-run trade off between inflation control and real economic stability 
that would make strict inflation targeting― an exclusive focus on stabi- 
lizing inflation― too costly to be socially desirable.
Flexible inflation targeting is generally defined as a monetary policy 
designed to stabilize inflation around a low target rate and to stabilize 
real economic activity as measured by an output gap. In academic re- 
search, flexible inflation targeting is modeled by assuming the central 
bank implements policy to minimize a quadratic loss function of the form
β π π λ+ +
=
− +∑ * 2 2
0
[( ) ]i t i t i
i
x
                    
(6)
where π i is inflation, π * is the inflation target, and xt is the output gap. 
Equation (6) can represent the objectives of formal inflation targeters as 
well has those of central banks such as the Federal Reserve that em- 
phasize the role of real objectives in addition to inflation.
Of course, a quadratic loss function such as (6) long predates the de- 
velopment of inflation targeting. It played a key role in models of the time 
inconsistency of optimal monetary policy that, during the 1980s and 
1990s, focused on explaining the high inflation rates experienced by many 
economies beginning in the late 1960s.12 In the more recent literature, 
this type of loss function is justified on both positive grounds as a rea- 
sonable representation of the actual objectives of policy makers and on 
normative grounds as a second order approximation to the welfare of 
the representative agent in standard new Keynesian models (Rotemberg 
11 Svensson (2002) summarized many of features of the consensus monetary 
policy and provided prescriptions for implementing monetary policy aimed at 
achieving low and stable inflation while also minimizing fluctuations in the real 
economy.
12 Those models assumed that the output objective in the loss function incor- 
porated a target level for output that exceed the natural rate of output.
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and Woodford 1997; Woodford 2003). In the context of the standard 
model, stabilizing inflation (actually, around a zero steady-state level) 
contributes to welfare because the presence of sticky prices leads, in 
the face of inflation volatility, to an inefficient dispersion of relative prices. 
In effect, inflation makes the price system work less effectively.
Prior to the crisis, inflation targeting (IT) was widely accepted as a 
successful policy framework, and recent favorable reviews of IT include 
Rose (2007) and Walsh (2009a). IT was successful in supporting low and 
stable inflation without generating the greater output volatility its critics 
had predicted. The financial crisis, though, has raised new questions 
about the future of inflation targeting.
The primary concern with inflation targeting, even of the flexible variety, 
was that other legitimate goals of macroeconomic policy would be neg- 
lected. Initially, this concern focused on the possibility that inflation tar- 
geting central banks would ignore real objectives such as stabilizing the 
output gap (for example, see B. Friedman 2004). Part of the reluctance 
of the Federal Reserve to adopt inflation targeting could be traced to its 
formal dual mandate―price stability and maximum sustainable employ- 
ment―and the notion that the second component of this mandate would 
be sacrificed under inflation targeting. As surveyed in Walsh (2009a), 
the empirical evidence does not support this view, at least with respect 
to output volatility. IT countries have not experienced any cost in terms 
of greater real economic instability. And while the consensus view that 
monetary policy should only be concerned with inflation and output gap 
stability may have contributed to the financial crisis by ignoring finan- 
cial distortions, this failure was not limited to IT central banks.
For emerging market economies, in fact, the adoption of inflation tar- 
geting as been associated with improved real and inflation macroeconomic 
performance. For high income economies, the benefits have perhaps been 
less apparent, as both inflation targeters and non-targeters benefited from 
the Great Moderation. However, inflation targeting definitely did not con- 
tributed to an increase in real economic volatility.
While it is easy to forget, the chief policy concern in 2006-2007 was 
the potential inflationary effects of the dramatic increase in commodity 
prices. Roger (2010) concludes that “Inflation-targeting economics appear 
to have done better than others in minimizing the inflationary impact of 
the 2007 surge in commodity prices ... Among low-income economics, 
however, non-inflation-targeting countries experienced bigger increases 
in inflation than inflation-targeting economics, although their gross do- 
mestic product growth rates fell by similar amounts. Among high-income 
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TABLE 1
REAL GDP: GROWTH RATE*
economies, inflation-targeting countries had a smaller growth rate decline 
than non-inflation-targeting countries and slightly less of an increase in 
inflation.” (p. 48)
The recent financial crisis has raised new concerns about inflation 
targeting. Of course, it seems unfair to blame IT for a crisis whose 
origins were in the United States, as the Federal Reserve is not a formal 
inflation targeter. If one views the financial crisis primarily as a negative 
aggregate demand shock causing both output and inflation to decline, 
then even a strict inflation targeter would respond with expansionary 
policies to prevent the collapse of aggregate spending. The result that 
policy needs to neutralize aggregate demand shocks is not dependent 
on assuming any particular weight on real versus inflation goals in the 
central bank's objective function.
One case in which an aggregate demand shock might be only partially 
neutralized arises if the central bank prefers to limit volatility in its 
policy interest rate. If it does, then the policy rate will generally be moved 
too little to prevent demand shocks from affecting the real economy. 
However, the standard argument for limiting interest rate volatility is 
that it reflects a desire by policy makers to reduce financial market in- 
stability. Such a motive would not support the argument that inflation- 
targeting central banks are insensitive to financial markets. And, just 
as the standard description of inflation targeting assumes the central 
bank engages in flexible inflation targeting to avoid unnecessary volatility 
in real output, it is also appropriate under flexible inflation targeting to 
ensure that achieving tighter control over inflation does not generate 
excessive financial instability.
In fact, inflation targeters have fared reasonably well since the crisis 
began. Tables 1-3 document the experiences of 33 high income counties, 
of whom 10 were inflation targeters. Table 1 reports the average growth 
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Source: Scott Roger, “Inflation targeting turns 20.” Finance and Development, 
March 2010, pp. 46-49. 
Note: The column ± indicates whether the central bank specifies a target rate 
with a symmetric band around the mid-point.
TABLE 3
INFLATION TARGETERS
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rate of real GDP for the 1995-2007 period, for 2008-2009, and, using 
the IMF forecasts, 2008-2010. While both inflation targeters and non- 
targeters have seen sharp falls in real growth, the inflation targeters 
have, as a group, done somewhat better.
Table 2 reports average CPI inflation rates. Perhaps somewhat sur- 
prising, average inflation has been higher among the targeters. And while 
average inflation is expected to be higher during 2008-2010 for the IT 
countries than it was during 1995-2007, it is projected to be lower for 
the non-IT countries. At a minimum, the evidence does not seem to be 
that IT countries suffer greater output declines because their central 
banks are too focused on controlling inflation.
Despite this relative success, reforms and replacements for inflation 
targeting have been proposed. I discuss three possible changes to in- 
flation targeting. One would involve aiming for higher average rates of 
inflation; one would add additional objectives to the central bank's list 
of goals; one would move to a policy of price level targeting.
A. Raising the Inflation Target
Prior to the crisis, a consensus existed among high income inflation 
targeters that a target within the range of 1-3 percent represented an 
appropriate goal for average inflation. This range is consistent with 
formal targets established by inflation targeting central banks (see Table 
3). Developing economies normally chose higher average target inflation 
rates, though among 26 inflation targeters, only nine had midpoints 
greater than 3 percent and just five had bands wider than ± percent 
around the target (see Table 3).
Central banks that have not formally adopted inflation targeting also 
seem to have implicit targets that fall in the 1-3 percent range. For ex- 
ample, the Federal Reserve does not announce a formal target for the 
inflation rate, but it is reasonable to interpret the long-term inflation 
forecast of members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) as 
equivalent to an implicit inflation target. This central tendency forecast 
for inflation in the longer term measured by the price index for personal 
consumption expenditures ranges between 1.5 and 2 percent. The ECB 
has stated publicly that inflation should remain at or below 2 percent.
If the ZLB poses a serious constraint on the ability of monetary policy 
to respond to economic contractions, then one change to IT would be to 
increase the average target for inflation. The lower the inflation target, 
the more likely the ZLB is encountered, a point first made by Summers 
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(1991). Reifschneider and Williams (2000) estimated that the ZLB is en- 
countered almost 10 percent of the time at a 1 percent inflation target, 
and this frequency falls as the target is raised.
A higher inflation target would leave more room for interest rate cuts 
in a crisis before encountering the zero lower bound. Williams (2009) 
finds that the ZLB has proven to be a hindrance to economic recovery 
in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, concluding that “... if recent 
events are a harbinger of a significantly more adverse macroeconomic 
climate than we have enjoyed over the preceding two decades, then a 2 
percent steady-state inflation rate may be insufficiently high to stop the 
ZLB from having significant deleterious effects on the macroeconomy if 
the central bank follows the standard Taylor rule.” (p. 3)
Using the FRB/US model and a Taylor rule to represent monetary 
policy, Williams (2009) shows that in simulation exercises using shocks 
drawn from the 1968-2002 period that the nominal rate falls below 
0.01 percent in 13 percent of the periods when the equilibrium real inter- 
est rate plus the inflation target equal 3 percent. Raising the inflation 
target by 2 percentage points (so the mean nominal rate is 5 percent), 
reduces this probability of the ZLB to 4 percent. What matters for deter- 
mining the frequency with which the ZLB is encountered is the distri- 
bution of the shocks affecting the real interest rate and the target infla- 
tion rate. Given the real rate, a higher inflation target reduces the chances 
the ZLB will become a constraint on policy. Williams (2009) concludes 
that “The analysis in this paper argues that an inflation target of between 
2 and 4 percent will, on average, be sufficient to avoid the ZLB causing 
sizable costs in terms of macroeconomic stabilization even in a much 
more adverse macroeconomic climate.” (p. 26)
Blanchard et al. (2010) are perhaps the most prominent proponents 
of raising the inflation target, and they have argued that a 4% average 
rate would constitute a safer target by providing more room for interest 
rate cuts when the economy faces an adverse shock. While raising the 
average inflation target may reduce the constraint posed by the ZLB, 
higher inflation does have costs. Inflation can generate a number of dis- 
tortions that reduce economic efficiency and welfare, though Blanchard 
et al. suggest that many of these distortions could be eliminated if tax 
systems were corrected to allow for higher average inflation. Bailey (1956) 
and Friedman (1969) identified a key inefficiency that arises when nom- 
inal interest rates are positive. Since money is costless to produce, ef- 
ficiency requires that the private opportunity cost of holding money also 
be zero. If nominal interest rates are positive, private agents will inef- 
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ficiently economize on their money holdings. An increase in the average 
rate of inflation would increase this efficiency cost. The size of the welfare 
cost due to this distortion of moving from 2 to 4 percent average inflation 
is likely to be small. Ireland (2009) has recently estimate the welfare cost 
due to reduced money holdings in the United States. He finds that, using 
a measure of the money stock that accounts for some of the changes 
due to financial market deregulation, the welfare cost of 2 percent infla- 
tion is less than 0.04 percent of income.
However, higher inflation need not raise the opportunity cost of holding 
money if money pays an own return that also rises with inflation. If i is 
the market rate of interest and im is the nominal interest rate paid on 
money, then eliminating the Friedman distortion simply requires that i
＝im, not that i＝0. While there may be technical difficulties in paying 
interest on cash, many countries, including now the United States, pay 
interest on bank reserves. If it becomes feasible to pay explicit interest 
on money, then the Friedman welfare costs of moving from an average 
inflation rate of 2 percent to one of 4 percent are likely to be small.
Paying interest on money has fiscal implications. the interest on money 
cannot be financed by printing additional money― attempting to do so 
rises i as inflation rises but fails to close the gap between i and im. 
Other sources of fiscal revenue must be used to finance interest on 
money, and this will require increases in other potentially distorting taxes.
The more recent literature on wage and price stickiness has empha- 
sized a second distortion that would be worsened by a rise inflation. 
When the adjustment of wages and prices is staggered across firms, 
and is not fully indexed, higher inflation generates an increase in relative 
wage and price dispersion. Because this dispersion is not generated by 
any fundamental shifts in the demand or supply of individual products 
or labor types, economic efficiency is reduced. Essentially with sticky 
wages and prices, inflation makes the price system work less efficiently 
as resources are reallocated in response to relative price and wage 
changes. Inflation reduces the ability of the price system to signal shifts 
in demand and supply that call for a reallocate of resources.
In calibrated models, this efficiency loss arising from relative price 
dispersion is significantly larger than the costs Friedman identified. 
Thus, even if the Friedman distortion is eliminated by paying interest 
on money, higher inflation could generate significant welfare costs by 
reducing the ability of the price system to direct resource allocation 
efficiently. In models that derive a loss function such as that given in 
(6) by taking a second order approximation to the utility function of the 
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representative agent, a failure to stabilize inflation around zero is more 
costly than allowing the output gap to fluctuate. For example, in the 
calibration of Woodford (2003), λ is equal to the elasticity of inflation 
with respect to marginal cost divided by the price elasticity of demand 
faced by individual firms. With standard values of the key parameter, 
this implies λ＝0.12 when inflation is expressed at annual rates.13
This price dispersion inefficiency is related to inflation variability and 
not necessarily to the average level of inflation. If firms indexed prices 
to the average rate of inflation, as is commonly assumed in many of the 
empirically estimated models employed for policy analysis, then a move 
from say 2 percent to 4 percent average inflation would not affect the 
dispersion of relative prices. However, since the micro data provide no 
evidence of this type of indexation, an increase in the average rate of 
inflation is likely to reduce the ability of the price system to efficiently 
guide the allocation of resources.
Besides reducing the chances of hitting the ZLB, other arguments have 
been made in favor of higher average inflation. For example, one tradi- 
tional argument for a bit of inflation is that it may increase the flexibi- 
lity of real wages if nominal wages display downward rigidity. Akerlof, 
Dickens, and Perry (1996) suggested that, due to the resistance to nom- 
inal wage cuts, the long-run (unemployment) Phillips curve is not vertical 
but has a negative slope at low rates of inflation. Thus, higher average 
inflation would lower the average rate of unemployment. This issues 
has recently been revisited by Benigno and Ricci (2010) who show how 
the Phillips curve flattens at low rates of inflation and shifts with changes 
in macro volatility. They argue that how low inflation should be kept 
can vary across countries depending on structural characteristics of the 
economy. Of course, higher inflation might induce more widespread wage 
indexation which would then hinder the ability of the economy to adjust 
to shocks requiring an adjustment of real wages.
If downward real wage stickiness is the problem, note that with trend 
productivity at 2-2.5 percent, and average inflation of 1-3 percent, nom- 
inal wage growth should be around 3-5.5 percent per year. This seems 
13 This is based on a Calvo frequency of price adjustment of ω＝0.25 per 
quarter, a discount factor of β＝0.99 and a demand elasticity of θ＝11. The 
formula for λ  is
ω ωβλ
θ ω
− −⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
1 (1 )(1 ) .
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sufficient to avoid the distortions associated with any failure of wages 
to be flexible in the downward direction. In addition, the evidence on 
wage stickiness is mixed. Pissarides (2009) concludes that wage stickiness 
does not explain the volatility of unemployment, and Kudlyak (2009) finds 
that the real user cost of labor is fairly cyclically sensitive.14 The evidence 
suggests that wages for new hirers display much greater flexibility than 
wages for existing workers. Thus, at the margin relevant for hiring 
decisions, wage stickiness may be less important. However, whenever a 
contraction leads firms to reduce their workforce by more than can be 
achieved through normal turnover, the inflexibility of nominal wages of 
existing workers can prevent the adjustment of real wages.
A more effective strategy for avoiding the ZLB would be reduce the 
risks of another major negative shock to aggregate demand. Better finan- 
cial market regulation, as well as a more active response of monetary 
policy to emerging financial imbalances could lower the chances of re- 
turning to the ZLB. The permanent distortionary costs of higher average 
inflation would need to be balanced against the low probability of another 
negative shock of the magnitude the global economy experienced in 2008. 
Clouse et al. (2003) note that low inflation at the beginning of the 1953, 
1956, and 1960 recessions in the U.S. did not pose a constraint on mon- 
etary policy. Interest rates were reduced, but the ZLB was not reached.
Finally, in considering whether average inflation targets should raised, 
it is important to recall that central banks have spent the past twenty- 
five years striving to reduce inflation and to gain the credibility neces- 
sary to maintain inflation at low and stable rates. The stability of inflation 
expectations has been a characteristic of the recent crisis, a stability 
that might have been less likely during earlier periods in which the com- 
mitment of central banks to low and stable inflation was less clear. 
This credibility may be put at risk if inflation targets are increased.
B. Adding Other Objectives
A second issue for inflation targeting is whether additional objectives 
should be included along with those of inflation and output gap stability. 
The theoretical rationale for flexible inflation targeting was based on 
models in which stabilizing the inflation gap and the output gap suc- 
ceeded in minimizing the distortions in the economy.15 When additional 
14 See also Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007).
15 This is not quite right. These models generally assume a fiscal subsidy is 
used to address the average distortion created by monopolistic competition. Con- 
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distortions are present, then a policy aimed at minimizing the welfare 
costs of economic fluctuations will need to expand the list of objectives 
beyond the minimization of inflation and output gaps.16 As recent re- 
search has shown, frictions in credit and labor markets call for the cen- 
tral bank to consider additional policy objectives. I will briefly review some 
of the literature in each area.
a) Credit Frictions
The financial crisis has, quite understandably, generated an enormous 
literature examining the implications of credit frictions for monetary 
policy. Examples include Christiano et al. (2007), Cúrdia and Woodford 
(2008, 2010), De Fiore and Tristani (2009), Demirel (2009), Faia and 
Monacelli (2007), Gertler and Karadi (2011), and Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2011), and the list of papers in this area continues to grow.
Much of this work has built on the agency cost model of Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders can generate a wedge between 
lending rates and the opportunity cost of funds; this wedge is affected 
by balance sheet considerations and asset prices. With asset prices and 
cash flows moving pro-cyclically, agency costs fall in booms and rise in 
downturns. Thus, a recession that weakens balance sheets also increases 
credit spreads, amplifying the effects of the original source of the cyclical 
movement. In normal times, therefore, balance sheet effects may be an 
important channel through which monetary policy actions affect the real 
economy.
The role of asset prices  Leading up to the crisis, there was an active 
debate over the appropriate role of asset prices in the conduct of mon- 
etary policy (Cecchetti et al. 2000, 2002; Borio and White 2003), but the 
consensus view was articulated by Bernanke and Gertler in 2001: 
“Changes in asset prices should affect monetary policy only to the extent 
that they affect the central bank's forecast of inflation.” (Bernanke and 
Gertler 2001, p. 253) Bernanke and Gertler indicated another situation 
in which asset prices might be relevant: if the equilibrium real interest 
rate were to be affected by financial market disturbances, then the policy 
sistent with that literature, I will continue to focus on the distortions that can 
be ameliorated by monetary policy.
16 For example, when nominal wages are sticky, optimal policy needs to con- 
sider a wage inflation gap as well as an inflation gap.
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interest rate would need to adjust to prevent these disturbances from 
affecting either inflation or the output gap.17
Consider the problem of minimizing (6), given the structure of the econ- 
omy represented by (1) and (2). Optimal policy can be characterized by 
a targeting rule that takes the form18
λπ
κ −
⎛ ⎞+ − =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1( ) 0.t t tx x
                       
(7)
If monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, optimal policy involves 
adjusting the policy instrument to ensure the expected value of this 
condition holds (Svensson and Woodford 2005), or 
λ
κ+ + + −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − = >⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
1( ) 0, ,t t i t i t iE x x x i k
                
(8)
where k depends on the lag with which policy affects the economy. It 
follows that any variable zt other than inflation and the output gap is 
relevant for optimal policy in only two circumstances. If, conditional on 
the past history of inflation and the output gap, zt Granger causes either 
inflation or the output gap, then zt can be useful in forecasting the vari- 
ables that appear in the optimal targeting rule (8). Or, from (1), if, con- 
ditional on the past history of inflation and the output gap, zt Granger 
causes the natural real rate of interest, then it is relevant for setting 
the policy instrument consistent with (8). 
The empirical research has not found consistent evidence for the value 
of financial variables in predicting inflation or output. Stock and Watson 
(2003, p. 822) conclude that “Some asset prices have been useful predic- 
tors of inflation and/or output growth in some countries in some periods.” 
Thus, while asset prices might in principle be among the macro vari- 
ables that the central bank should respond to, in practice their lack of 
forecasting ability was viewed as rendering them largely irrelevant for 
monetary policy.
Are asset prices only relevant if they aid forecasting?  Independent 
of forecasting value, would the addition of stock prices to a simple policy 
17 See also Kohn (2008).
18 This describes optimal commitment policy from the timeless perspective.
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rule lead to improved outcomes as measured by inflation and output 
gap stability? That is, does responding to asset prices improve policy out- 
comes? Bernanke and Gertler (2001) evaluate policy rules in a model 
with financial frictions and find little value in responding to asset prices. 
Similarly Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) find that a targeting rule such as 
(7) that ignores credit frictions performs well.
Several papers have shown that monetary policy should dampen vol- 
atility in credit spreads (e.g., De Fiore and Tristani 2009; Cúrdia and 
Woodford 2010). In these models, fluctuations in credit spreads reflect 
inefficiencies that reduce social welfare. Cúrdia and Woodford assume 
borrowing and lending must occur through a financial intermediary, 
and real resources are required to carry out this intermediation service. 
The credit spread fluctuates as a result of inefficient variations in the 
markup of lending rates over borrowing rates, and optimal policy involves 
moving interest rates inversely with shocks to the credit spread. Demirel 
(2009) finds that frictions associate with monitoring costs in financial 
markets increase the weight that should be placed on stabilizing real 
economic activity relative to inflation.
The way policy should respond to credit spreads to stabilize real eco- 
nomic activity is not always so clear. For example, Faia and Monacelli 
(2007) examine variants of simply Taylor rules that allow for a reaction 
to the price of capital (the asset price in their model). They find that strict 
inflation stabilization is optimal. However, assuming the central bank 
responds moderately to inflation (a coefficient equal to 1.5) and does not 
respond to output (output is in the rule, not an output gap), welfare is 
improved if policy does respond to asset prices. But because Faia and 
Monacelli assume productivity shocks are the source of fluctuations, 
optimal policy calls for cutting interest rates in response to a rise in 
asset prices. The reason for this response is that financial frictions limit 
any increase in investment spending in the face of a positive producti- 
vity disturbance. This is inefficient, and reducing the policy interest rate 
helps move the level of investment closer to the efficient level.
One advantage of the analysis of Faia and Monacelli (2007) is that 
policy outcomes are evaluated on the basis of the implications for the 
welfare of the representative agent in the economy. This means that the 
costs of financial market distortions are explicitly accounted for in judging 
alternative policies. This is in contrast to some of the earlier work such 
as Bernanke and Gertler (2001) who used a loss functions such as (6) 
to rank policies, thereby ignoring any potential gains from responding 
to financial market distortions.
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In general, fluctuations in credit spreads and asset prices can affect 
both aggregate demand and aggregate supply. On the demand side, they 
act as an inefficient tax on investment; on the supply side they affect 
firm borrowing costs and therefore marginal costs. Thus, a rise in the 
credit spread reduces aggregate demand and simultaneously increases 
inflation. This suggests that the appropriate policy response to a rise in 
credit spreads will be uncertain. The contractionary impact on demand 
would call for a more expansionary policy― an interest rate reduction 
could offset partially the implicit tax on investment spending― yet the 
inflationary effect on marginal costs would call for a tighter monetary 
policy.
Figure 7 provides some evidence on whether demand or supply chan- 
nels of credit spreads dominate. The figure shows impulse responses from 
a VAR estimated over the 1974:1-2007:4 period using quarterly U.S. 
data. The VAR includes a measure of the output gap (log real GDP minus 
the log of the CBO estimate of potential GDP), inflation (PCE less food 
and energy), the funds rate, the 10 year Treasury rate (FCM10), the 
spread between the Baa corporate bond rate and the 10-year Treasury 
rate, and the exchange rate (log trade-weighted real exchange rate).19 
To make the figure easier to read, the responses to output and inflation 
shocks are not shown. The standard output decline and inflation price 
puzzle phenomenon are seen in response to a funds rate shock (column 
1). The rise in the funds rate leads to an increase in the long-term rate, 
but the spread on corporate bonds over the 10-year rate falls initially 
before rising. Finally, the dollar appreciates. Innovations to the credit 
spread variable (column 3) lead to declines in both output and inflation, 
indicating that these shocks primarily act as aggregate demand shocks. 
In response, the funds rate falls. Finally, an innovation to the exchange 
rate (an appreciation, column 4) has little effect on output but does 
lead to a decline in inflation and interest rates. The impulse responses 
to the credit spread reported in Figure 7 suggest that shocks to the 
credit spread have primarily operated as aggregate demand shocks. There- 
fore, a rise in spreads would call for a cut in the policy rate.
Financial market segmentation  A different form of financial friction 
arises in the presence of market segmentation. One type of market seg- 
mentation arises due to limited participation in financial markets. For 
19 The sample start date is determined by the availability of the exchange rate 
series. The end date is chosen to exclude the recent financial crisis.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS454
example, in the typical limited participation model, households were as- 
sumed to be locked into portfolio choices prior to the occurrence of any 
open market operations.20 Only banks and firms continued to interact 
in financial markets when the central bank intervened. As a conse- 
quence, open market operations have distributional effects as any change 
in the level of base money has to be absorbed by only a subset of the 
economy's agents. In these models, monetary shocks generate effects on 
real interest rates by imposing restrictions on the ability of agents to 
engage in certain types of financial transactions rather than imposing 
restrictions on the ability of firms to adjust prices.
The restrictions on financial trading mean that cash injections via open 
market operations can create a wedge between the value of cash in the 
hands consumers in the goods market and the value of cash in the fi- 
nancial market. A cash injection lowers the value of cash in the finan- 
cial market and lowers the nominal rate of interest. Standard limited 
participation models assume that firms must borrow to fund their wage 
bill, so the appropriate marginal cost of labor to firms is the real wage 
times the gross rate of interest on loans. Thus, an interest-rate decline 
lowers the marginal cost of labor; at each real wage, labor demand in- 
creases, and equilibrium employment and output rise. In addition, a 
wedge is created between the current marginal utility of consumption 
and its future expected value adjusted for the expected real return (see 
Walsh 2010, ch. 5). As a consequence, financial factors affect current 
aggregate spending. Thus, with segmented financial markets, develop- 
ments in the financial sector can have direct effects on demand, and 
the dichotomy between real and monetary factors that characterizes the 
standard new Keynesian model breaks down.
Financial frictions due to agency costs and those due to market seg- 
mentation can interact. Most models have focused on frictions between 
lenders and firms, but problems during the recent crisis seemed to have 
affected the flow of funds among financial institutions. This suggests 
intermediaries also have problems raising funds from other interme- 
diaries, for example in an interbank market. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) 
show that, in the absence of an agency problem in the interbank market, 
funds can flow from those banks without investment opportunities to 
banks with investment opportunities. Disruptions in the interbank market 
can affect real activity, leading financial markets to become segmented, 
20 Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002) develop a model of endogenous market 
segmentation.
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generating an inefficient allocation of funds among intermediaries (and 
hence among the firms needing to borrow from intermediaries). In the 
face of a negative shock to the quality of capital, Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2011) find that central bank allocation of credit to those markets with 
large spreads can dampen the effects of the shock. This type of policy 
response can be likened to the Fed's credit easing policies.
Summary on financial frictions  Most of the recent research has 
focused on how financial frictions affect the transmission process of 
monetary policy. Fluctuations in credit spreads and borrowing constraints 
matter for aggregate spending, and monetary policy may be able to affect 
them directly. Distortions in financial markets that generate real effects 
of monetary policy also imply that financial stability may require making 
trade-offs with the goals of inflation stability and stability of real eco- 
nomic activity. While movements in credit spreads may provide one mea- 
sure of the type of inefficient fluctuations that would call for a policy 
response, we still do not fully understand the factors that generate 
movements in spreads, or the degree to which these movements reflect 
inefficient fluctuations that call for policy responses.
This discussion has focused on the role of financial variables in non- 
bubble situations. A separate issue, and one actively debated during the 
past decade, is whether monetary policy should attempt to lean against 
asset price bubbles. Cecchetti et al. (2000), Cecchetti et al. (2002), and 
Borio and White (2003) have argued that central banks should. Yet the 
consensus view prior to the crisis was that policy makers were limited in 
their ability to identify bubbles, and even if they could identify a bubble, 
monetary policy was too blunt an instrument to deal with this problem 
(Bernanke and Gertler 2001; Bernanke 2002; Gertler 2003; Kohn 2008). 
While monetary policy may, in general, be a blunt tool for dealing with 
an asset price bubble, housing investment and house prices are in fact 
a main channel through which the interest rate policy of the Federal 
Reserve affects real economic activity. The housing bubble was even- 
tually popped by the Fed's tighten of policy beginning in 2004. Un- 
doubtedly, future policy makers will be more willing to risk undertaking 
policies to deflate incipient bubbles, though the difficulty of identifying 
them with certainty will always remain.
b) Labor Market Frictions
Credit frictions have not been the only frictions modern models have 
incorporated. A large literature has studied the implications of two types 
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of frictions that characterize labor markets.
First, since the original work of Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), 
it has become common, at least in empirical policy models, to incorporate 
nominal wage rigidities. The staggered adjustment of wages generates 
an inefficient dispersion of relative wages whenever nominal wage inflation 
deviates from zero. Optimal policy must balance the resulting welfare 
cost against the welfare costs of relative price dispersion that is gener- 
ated when price inflation deviates from zero. If, as a result of real shocks, 
real wages need to adjust, the goals of price stability and of wage sta- 
bility clash.
Second, an alternative literature has worked to embed unemployment 
into policy models, and much of this literature has built on the Mortensen- 
Pissarides model of labor market search frictions (e.g., Walsh 2005 and 
the survey by Galí 2010). In this class of search models, the initial em- 
ployment level (the number of matches) is a critical state variable that 
affects the dynamics of economic adjustment, and the evolution of em- 
ployment depends on the incentives firms have to create jobs and the 
frictions that prevent unmatched vacancies and unemployment workers 
from quickly matching.
Ravenna and Walsh (2011) show that in a basic model with labor 
search frictions the welfare-consistent loss function takes the form
2 2 2
0
[ ],it t i x t i t i
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where the new term, θ t
2, is the squared deviation of labor market tight- 
ness (vacancies relative to unemployment) around its efficient level. That 
is, policy should stability inflation, the output gap, and a labor market 
gap.21 The intuition behind the appearance of this labor market objec- 
tives is instructive. Recall that price inflation is costly because it gener- 
ates an inefficient dispersion of relative prices. This reduces welfare be- 
cause, conditional on total consumption, it leads the economy to produce 
an inefficient bundle of goods. Similarly, when market production is 
subject to frictions in matching workers and firms, deviations of labor 
market tightness from its efficient level lead, for a given level of utility, 
to an inefficient combination of market production (which incurs search 
costs) and non-market activities (which do not incur search costs).
21 As Ravenna and Walsh (2011) show, θ t can be equivalently expressed in 
terms of a measure of unemployment and lagged unemployment.
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Thus, frictions in the labor market can make labor market conditions 
and variables such as the unemployment rate appropriate objectives for 
monetary policy, though as with the output gap, it is not the level of 
labor market variables that should be stabilized but only their volatility 
around a correctly defined but difficult to measure efficient level.
c) Summary on Policy Objectives
Standard new Keynesian models for monetary policy emphasize the 
importance of price stability and lead to a specification of policy objec- 
tives that is naturally characterized in terms of flexible inflation targeting. 
However, the only distortion amenable to monetary policy actions in the 
basic versions of these models arises from the presence of sticky prices, 
so it is not surprising that policy should offset this distortion by stabi- 
lizing prices. In models with multiple distortions, such as inefficiencies 
in credit markets or in labor markets, policy makers face multiple and 
potentially conflicting objectives. Eliminating any one distortion, by 
focusing solely on price stability for example, may lead to suboptimal 
outcomes by worsening other economic distortions. Despite this, a com- 
mon result in much of the literature that has focused on multiple sources 
of distortions is that price stability is often a close approximation to the 
optimal policy. For example, this is the finding of Faia and Monacelli 
(2007) in a model with credit frictions and Thomas (2008) and Ravenna 
and Walsh (2011) in models with labor market frictions.
C. Price Level Targeting
The constraint posed by the zero lower bound on the nominal policy 
interest rate has led to renewed interest in price-level targeting (PLT) as 
an alternative to inflation targeting (IT). Two arguments have been made 
in favor of price level targeting over inflation targeting. First, price level 
targeting may have advantages to the extent that it can lead inflation 
expectations to act as an automatic stabilizer. Second, price level tar- 
geting, by reducing errors in forecasting future prices, may reduce long- 
term risk and facilitate economic planning by households and firms. I 
will focus on the first of these two arguments― employing expectations 
as automatic stabilizers― in part because the difference in forecast error 
variances for long-term price level forecasts under PLT and IT seems 
small. For example, Kahn (2009), in updating estimates originally due 
to McCallum (1999), finds that with a current price level set at 100 and 
a target inflation rate of 2 percent, the 95 percent confidence interval 
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for the price level in twenty years would be [147 157]; this represents a 
range of ±3.2 percent around the expected price path. This seems a 
relative small degree of uncertainty relative to other sources of both macro 
and individual uncertainty faced over a twenty year period.
a) Expectations as Automatic Stabilizers
An advantage of price-level targeting is its ability to mimic an optimal 
commitment policy when the actual regime is one of discretion (Svensson 
1999; Vestin 2006). This improvement occurs even though inflation sta- 
bility is the ultimate objective of the central bank. The knowledge that 
prices will return to a target level influences expected inflation in ways 
that help to stabilize current inflation when price setting behavior is 
forward looking.22 This role for expectations can be particularly impor- 
tant in a deflationary environment at the zero lower bound. As the actual 
price level falls, the gap widens between the actual price level and the 
path for prices implied by the target path. The more severe the deflation, 
the greater must be the subsequent inflation to return prices to their 
intended path. Thus, a credible commitment to PLT would cause expected 
inflation to rise, helping to boost nominal interest rates above the ZLB. 
That is, under PLT, expectations serve as an automatic stabilizer.
Most discussions of PLT combine it with a positive trend or average 





where πT is the average rate of inflation and p0 is the initial price level. 
This process for the target makes pt
T a trend stationary variable so that 
the subsequent inflation needed after a deviation of prices below the 
target path rises with πT. A positive trend to the price path strengthens 
the way expectations act as an automatic stabilizer after deflationary 
shocks since, with the target path rising over time, the gap between it 
and the actual price level, should a deflation occur, grows over time 
and amplifies the rise in expected inflation (if the path is credible).
The effect on inflation expectations of adopting PLT will depend on 
when it is adopted and how quickly the public expects deviations from 
target to be eliminated. Figure 5 shows the price level in the U.S., mea- 
22 Not surprising, therefore, Walsh (2003) found that price level targeting per- 
formed less satisfactorily in a discretionary environment when the inflation process 
displays inertia.
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FIGURE 5
THE PCE INDEX AND HYPOTHETICAL PRICE CONES BEGINNING JANUARY 
2007 AND JANUARY 2008. LOWER PATHS CORRESPOND TO 1.5% 
INFLATION, THE UPPER PATHS TO 2.0% INFLATION.
sured by the PCE chained index together with hypothetical 1.5 percent 
and 2.0 percent paths. These rates correspond to the upper and lower 
ranges of the longer-run inflation forecasts of the FOMC members. One 
set of paths begins in January 2007, the other in January 2008. If the 
Fed had adopted price level targeting with a 2.0 percent drift in January 
2007, the movement of the PCE index above the target path would have 
called for a tighter monetary policy throughout 2008 and would have 
generated expectations of deflation over this period. Thus, it is not evi- 
dent that adopting PLT would have contributed a stabilizing influence, 
nor would it have generated increases in expected inflation that might 
have reduced real interest rates at the ZLB.
The story is somewhat more supportive of a contributing role for PLT 
if it had been adopted in January 2008. The PCE index has fallen per- 
sistently below even the 1.5 percent price path in this case, suggesting 
that credible price level targeting might have raised expected inflation.
Figure 6 shows hypothetical paths for expected inflation under a price- 
level targeting regime in the U.S. based on two different start dates, 
January 2007 and January 2008, under the assumption that the public 
expects prices to return to target within four quarters. In the top panel, 
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FIGURE 6
EXPECTED INFLATION WHEN PRICES ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE 
TARGET PATH IN FOUR QUARTERS WITH A 1.75% INFLATION RATE PRICE 
PATH. PATHS ARE SHOWN FOR PLT BEGINNING JAN. 2007 (DOTTED, 
EXP2007) AND JAN. 2008 (EXP2008). TOP PANEL: PCE. BOTTOM 
PANEL: PCE LESS FOOD AND ENERGY
the price level is assumed to be measured by the PCE, and the target 
path rises at a 1.75 percent annual rate, the mid-point of the FOMC's 
central tendency. The bottom panel uses the PCE excluding food and 
energy. Also shown in each panel is a line at 1.75 percent, corresponding 
to inflation expectations anchored under an inflation targeting regime. 
In the top panel, the paths for expectations under price level targeting 
for both start dates fall below 1.75 percent for part of the period, par- 
ticularly in the first half of 2008 when expectations actually turn negative 
based on the January 2007 start date. Because inflation rose above the 
assumed 1.75 percent target in 2007, a price-level targeting policy would 
have required a deflation by early 2008. Incorporating a higher trend 
inflation rate into the price path would shift the paths for expected in- 
flation up, but this would not change the conclusion that establishing a 
price-level target in early 2007 would have initially produced a fall in 
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expected inflation, exacerbating the ZLB problem.23
Because inflation in the U.S. has remained relatively stable, falling 
from October 2008 through January 2009 but then returning to levels 
similar to those seen in 2006 and 2007, the path of the core PCE ex- 
cluding food and energy shown in the bottom panel of Figure 6 has not 
diverged much from the hypothetical target paths. As a consequence, 
expectations would have remained close to the level of the inflation 
target.
The hypothetical paths in the figure assume complete credibility of the 
price-level targeting regime. Just as the adoption of inflation targeting 
did not produce immediate credibility, it is likely that any switch to price- 
level targeting would involve gradual learning on the part of the public 
before the regime gained the level of credibility now enjoyed by inflation 
targeting. Kryvtsov, Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt (2008) show that the gains 
from imperfectly credible price-level targeting in a calibrated model are 
fairly small, and the gains may not be sufficient to dominant inflation 
targeting if credibility is obtained slowly.24 However, repeating this ex- 
ercise using the Bank of Canada's policy model ToTEM, Cateau et al. 
(2008) found the ultimate gains from price-level targeting to be more 
significant.25
One advantage of PLT typically missing from model, is due to the 
presence of nominal debt contracts. While nominal interest rates can 
adjust to compensate for average inflation expected over the duration of 
a contract, PLT, by increasing the predictability of the future price level, 
can reduce risk premiums associated with nominal contracts. In a DSGE 
model estimated using Canadian data and including agency costs and 
nominally denominated debt, Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang (2008) find that 
PLT reduces the volatility of the real interest rate. This helps reduce 
distortions associated with nominal contracts.26
23 Of course, this analysis ignores the fact that the price level might have evolved 
differently during 2007 and 2008 if the Federal Reserve had adopted price-level 
targeting.
24 They ignore the ZLB in their analysis.
25 Battini and Yates (2003) consider what they describe as hybrid inflation and 
price-level targeting. The central bank is assigned an objective that combines 
both inflation and the price level, and optimal trade-off frontiers are mapped. 
They argue that much of the benefit of price-level targeting is obtained when 
only a small weight is placed on the price level in the objective that guides the 
design of policy. See also Billi (2008).
26 They also provide references to the related literature investigating price-level 
targeting with nominal contracts.
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b) Should Central Banks Adopt PLT at the ZLB?
If PLT has the potential to contribute to better macroeconomic stability 
at the ZLB, should central banks adopt PLT? Several points are relevant 
for evaluating this question.
Given concerns about deflation, it is worth noting that PLT does not 
eliminate the possibility of a liquidity trap. If monetary policy is imple- 
mented using a Taylor rule in which inflation deviations from target are 
replaced by price level deviations from target, an expectational-driven 
liquidity trap is still possible.27 However, when the economy is pushed 
into a liquidity trap as a result of a fall in the equilibrium real interest 
rate, PLT ensures expectations move in a manner that helps to stabilize 
the economy.
There are several reasons for questioning the efficacy of adopting price- 
level targeting when an economy is at the ZLB. First, the stabilizing ad- 
justment of expectations requires that the public understands the impli- 
cations of price-level targeting, believes the central bank is committed 
to PLT, and adjust their expectations accordingly. Gaining credibility for 
PLT in the midst of a liquidity trap may be particularly challenging. 
While past commitment to a price level target might aid in avoiding a 
ZLB or mitigating the impact of a ZLB situation, adopting a new, un- 
tested targeting regime while in a crisis seems inadvisable. In addition, 
at the ZLB, if commitment to a price level target did cause inflation ex- 
pectations to rise, this would also lead to a rise in long-term nominal 
interest rates. This rise in long-term rates may easily lead some to 
question the central bank's commitment to economic expansion.
Second, the impact on expectations depends importantly on the speed 
with which the public expects the central bank to regain the target path. 
This may be hard for the public to forecast since there would be no past 
experience to draw upon. Similarly, it may be difficult for the central 
bank to assess the impact of the regime change on the public's expect- 
ations. If expectations are for an extended recession, the public may 
doubt whether the target path will be achieved very quickly. This would 
reduce the effect PLT would have in raising inflation expectations.
Third, there is the question of which price index to target. Given the 
volatility of headline inflation, targeting the headline price index might 
generate destabilizing movements in expectations, as Figure 6 illustrated. 
Many critics of inflation targeting in open economies point to the problem 
of defining targets in terms of headline inflation. A depreciation then 
27 See Walsh (2009b) for a demonstration of this point.
                IMPLEMENTING MONETARY POLICY 463
FIGURE 7
IMPULSE RESPONSES FROM A VAR ESTIMATED FOR THE U.S., 
1974:1-2007:4. SEE TEXT FOR DETAILS
requires the central bank to contract domestic output to reduce inflation 
in domestic goods prices. This potential problem is even more severe with 
price-level targeting.
Finally, commitment to a price path that involves future inflation is 
time inconsistent. Recall that the price-level target is a means of im- 
plementing the optimal commitment policy, and this policy is itself time 
inconsistent. Once the economy recovers from the ZLB, the optimal policy 
is not to create the inflation required to restore the price level to the pro- 
mised target path. Many central banks have committed to inflation tar- 
geting. They have developed credibility by delivering low and stable in- 
flation. The optimal strategy at the ZLB is to change the policy regime 
to one of price level targeting, and of course to promise never to change 
the policy framework again. Changing the policy regime in a crisis is 
exactly what discretion would call for; optimal commitment means doing 
what you had previously promised to do, even if it is not the optimal 
thing to do at the moment.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS464
IV. Conclusions
In the face of multiple distortions, multiple instruments are necessary, 
and central banks have added to the set of tools that they can employ. 
While many of the actions taken during the crisis, such as private sector 
asset purchases or debt management operations designed to affect the 
maturity composition of government debt, are essentially fiscal operations 
and not likely to play a role in normal times, the payment of interest on 
reserves, the use of channel systems, and the separation of quantitative 
policies and market interest rate policies is likely to remain.
The effectiveness of unconventional policies such as credit easing de- 
pend on the extent to which assets are imperfect substitutes or financial 
markets are segmented. These are both aspects of financial markets that 
we do not yet fully understand. Clearly the next generation of models 
will incorporate credit frictions, but in the models developed to date, these 
frictions often do not seem to generate big differences in the transmis- 
sion mechanism. The sources of financial shocks and how best to respond 
to them is still an open issue on which no consensus has developed. 
The same is true of labor market frictions, whether arising from sticky 
nominal wages or from search and matching frictions. As Chari, Kehoe, 
and McGrattan (2009) have noted with respect to the standard new 
Keynesian model, we need to know the sources of shocks if we are to 
determine whether they call for a policy response.
Flexible inflation target seems to have worked well during the crisis, 
but the constraints associated with the zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates has led to proposals to raise average inflation targets. When 
macro volatility is at the levels seen during the Great Moderation, occur- 
rences of the ZLB may be sufficiently rare that raising average inflation 
is unnecessary. But if macroeconomic shocks are likely to be larger in 
the future, the benefits of higher average inflation increase, though these 
must be balanced against the costs of higher inflation.
Price level targeting may lead inflation expectations to move in a sta- 
bilizing fashion, particularly in helping to avoid the ZLB. However, the 
date PLT is adopted, the choice of price index, the underlying average 
trend inflation rate, and the speed with which price level deviations from 
the target path are expected to be reversed are all important for deter- 
mining whether PLT would be a desirable policy regime.
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